Replication data for: You Owe Me

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Code_and_Data			10/12/2019 02:25:AM
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Project Citation:

Malmendier, Ulrike, and Schmidt, Klaus M. Replication data for: You Owe Me. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2017. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112996V1

Project Description

Summary: In business and politics, gifts are often aimed at influencing the recipient at the expense of third parties. In an experimental study, which removes informational and incentive confounds, subjects strongly respond to small gifts even though they understand the gift giver's intention. Our findings question existing models of social preferences. They point to anthropological and sociological theories about gifts creating an obligation to reciprocate. We capture these effects in a simple extension of existing models. We show that common policy responses (disclosure, size limits) may be ineffective, consistent with our model. Financial incentives are effective but can backfire.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
      C92 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
      D62 Externalities
      D64 Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
      Z13 Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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Published Versions

V1 [2019-10-12]

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DDI 2.5

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