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Project Citation: 

Cicala, Steve. Replication data for: When Does Regulation Distort Costs? Lessons from Fuel Procurement in US Electricity Generation. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2015. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112957V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary This paper evaluates changes in fuel procurement practices by coal and gas-fired power plants in the United States following state-level legislation that ended cost-of-service regulation of electricity generation. I find that deregulated plants substantially reduce the price paid for coal (but not gas) and tend to employ less capital-intensive sulfur abatement techniques relative to matched plants that were not subject to any regulatory change. Deregulation also led to a shift toward more productive coal mines. I show how these results lend support to theories of asymmetric information, capital bias, and regulatory capture as important sources of regulatory distortion. (JEL L51, L71, L94, L98, Q35, Q41, Q48)

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      L51 Economics of Regulation
      L71 Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Hydrocarbon Fuels
      L94 Electric Utilities
      L98 Industry Studies: Utilities and Transportation: Government Policy
      Q35 Hydrocarbon Resources
      Q41 Energy: Demand and Supply; Prices
      Q48 Energy: Government Policy


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