Replication data for: Efficient Bailouts?

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Project Citation:

Bianchi, Javier. Replication data for: Efficient Bailouts? Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2016. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112896V1

Project Description

Summary: We develop a quantitative equilibrium model of financial crises to assess the interaction between ex post interventions in credit markets and the buildup of risk ex ante. During a systemic crisis, bailouts relax balance sheet constraints and mitigate the severity of the recession. Ex ante, the anticipation of such bailouts leads to an increase in risk-taking, making the economy more vulnerable to a financial crisis. We find that moral hazard effects are limited if bailouts are systemic and broad-based. If bailouts are idiosyncratic and targeted, however, this makes the economy significantly more exposed to financial crises.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
      E23 Macroeconomics: Production
      E32 Business Fluctuations; Cycles
      E44 Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
      E63 Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
      G01 Financial Crises
      G21 Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
      G28 Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation

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Published Versions

V1 [2019-10-12]

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