Replication data for: Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-Riding in International Climate Policy

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Project Citation:

Nordhaus, William. Replication data for: Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-Riding in International Climate Policy. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2015. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112858V1

Project Description

Summary: Notwithstanding great progress in scientific and economic understanding of climate change, it has proven difficult to forge international agreements because of free-riding, as seen in the defunct Kyoto Protocol. This study examines the club as a model for international climate policy. Based on economic theory and empirical modeling, it finds that without sanctions against non-participants there are no stable coalitions other than those with minimal abatement. By contrast, a regime with small trade penalties on non-participants, a Climate Club, can induce a large stable coalition with high levels of abatement. (JEL Q54, Q58, K32, K33)

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
      K32 Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
      K33 International Law
      Q54 Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
      Q58 Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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V1 [2019-10-11]

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