Replication data for: Debt Contracts with Partial Commitment

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Project Citation:

Kovrijnykh, Natalia. Replication data for: Debt Contracts with Partial Commitment. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2013. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112683V1

Project Description

Summary: This paper analyzes a dynamic lending relationship where the borrower cannot be forced to make repayments, and the lender offers long-term contracts that are imperfectly enforced and repeatedly renegotiated. No commitment and full commitment by the lender are special cases of this model where the probability of enforcement equals zero and one, respectively. I show that an increase in the degree of enforcement can lower social welfare. Furthermore, properties of equilibrium investment dynamics with partial commitment drastically differ from those with full and no commitment. In particular, investment is positively related to cash flow, consistent with empirical findings.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
      D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
      D86 Economics of Contract: Theory
      G21 Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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V1 [2019-10-11]

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