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Project Citation: 

Fehr, Ernst, Herz, Holger, and Wilkening, Tom. Replication data for: The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2013. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112646V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary Authority and power permeate political, social, and economic life, but empirical knowledge about the motivational origins and consequences of authority is limited. We study the motivation and incentive effects of authority experimentally in an authority-delegation game. Individuals often retain authority even when its delegation is in their material interest—suggesting that authority has nonpecuniary consequences for utility. Authority also leads to overprovision of effort by the controlling parties, while a large percentage of subordinates underprovide effort despite pecuniary incentives to the contrary. Authority thus has important motivational consequences that exacerbate the inefficiencies arising from suboptimal delegation choices.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      C92 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
      D23 Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
      D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design


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