Replication data for: Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate

Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Judd B. Kessler; Alvin E. Roth

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Project Citation:

Kessler, Judd B., and Roth, Alvin E. Replication data for: Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2012. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112543V1

Project Description

Summary: Organ donations from deceased donors provide the majority of transplanted organs in the United States, and one deceased donor can save numerous lives by providing multiple organs. Nevertheless, most Americans are not registered organ donors despite the relative ease of becoming one. We study in the laboratory an experimental game modeled on the decision to register as an organ donor and investigate how changes in the management of organ waiting lists might impact donations. We find that an organ allocation policy giving priority on waiting lists to those who previously registered as donors has a significant positive impact on registration. (JEL C91, D64, I11)

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
      C91 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
      D64 Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
      I11 Analysis of Health Care Markets

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V1 [2019-10-11]

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