Replication data for: The Economics of Credence Goods: An Experiment on the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation, and Competition

Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Uwe Dulleck; Rudolf Kerschbamer; Matthias Sutter

Name	File Type	Size	Last Modified
AER_20090648-ztt-files.zip	application/zip	58.2 KB	10/11/2019 11:41:AM
AER_20090648_raw_data-do-file.zip	application/zip	171.5 KB	10/11/2019 11:41:AM
LICENSE.txt	text/plain	14.6 KB	10/11/2019 11:41:AM
readme.txt	text/plain	4.8 KB	10/11/2019 11:41:AM

Project Citation:

Dulleck, Uwe, Kerschbamer, Rudolf, and Sutter, Matthias. Replication data for: The Economics of Credence Goods: An Experiment on the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation, and Competition. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2011. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112407V1

Project Description

Summary: Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market breakdown. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that liability or verifiability yield efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability at best a minor, effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation has little influence, as predicted. Seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade, but does not lead to higher efficiency as long as liability is violated. (JEL D12, D82)

Scope of Project

Subject Terms: experiment; Credence goods

JEL Classification:
D12 Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

Geographic Coverage: Austria

Time Period(s): 2005 – 2009

Data Type(s): experimental data

Methodology

Data Source: Experimental lab data

Unit(s) of Observation: Experimental participants,

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Published Versions

V1 [2019-10-11]

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