Replication data for: Contractibility and the Design of Research Agreements
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Josh Lerner; Ulrike Malmendier
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Lerner, Josh, and Malmendier, Ulrike. Replication data for: Contractibility and the Design of Research Agreements. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2010. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112325V1
Project Description
Summary:
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We analyze how contractibility affects contract design. A major concern when
designing research agreements is that researchers use their funding to subsidize
other projects. We show that, when research activities are not contractible, an
option contract is optimal. The financing firm obtains the option to terminate
the agreement and, in case of termination, broad property rights. The threat
of termination deters researchers from cross-subsidization, and the cost of
exercising the termination option deters the financing firm from opportunistic
termination. We test this prediction using 580 biotechnology research agreements.
Contracts with termination options are more common when research is
non-contractible. (JEL D86, L65, O31, O34)
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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D86 Economics of Contract: Theory
L65 Chemicals; Rubber; Drugs; Biotechnology; Plastics
O31 Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
O34 Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
D86 Economics of Contract: Theory
L65 Chemicals; Rubber; Drugs; Biotechnology; Plastics
O31 Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
O34 Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
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