Data and Code for "Taxing Hidden Wealth: The Consequences of U.S. Enforcement Initiatives on Evasive Foreign Accounts"

Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Niels Johannesen, University of Copenhagen; Patrick Langetieg, Internal Revenue Service; Daniel Reck, London School of Economics; Max Risch, Princeton University; Joel Slemrod, University of Michigan

Version: View help for Version V1

Name	File Type	Size	Last Modified
Table_Fig2_AllFilers.csv	text/csv	211 bytes	11/19/2019 12:06:PM
Table_Fig3A_NewDisclosers.csv	text/csv	208 bytes	11/19/2019 12:06:PM
Table_Fig3B_NewDisclosures_AccountValue.csv	text/csv	217 bytes	11/19/2019 12:06:PM
Table_Fig4_HavenVsNonhaven_USvNon.csv	text/csv	804 bytes	11/19/2019 12:06:PM
Table_Fig5_CountryFirstDiff.csv	text/csv	1.6 KB	11/19/2019 12:06:PM
Table_Fig6_Acctval.csv	text/csv	728 bytes	11/19/2019 12:06:PM
Table_Fig7_IntensiveMarginCombined.csv	text/csv	417 bytes	11/19/2019 12:06:PM
Table_Fig8A_acctvalcat_filers_proportions_first_ovd.csv	text/csv	941 bytes	11/19/2019 12:06:PM
Table_Fig8B_country_filer_proportions_first_ovd.csv	text/csv	1.7 KB	11/19/2019 12:06:PM
Table_FigA1_AmendVsNonamend.csv	text/csv	285 bytes	11/19/2019 12:06:PM

Citation:

Johannesen, Niels, Langetieg, Patrick, Reck, Daniel, Risch, Max, and Slemrod, Joel. Data and Code for “Taxing Hidden Wealth: The Consequences of U.S. Enforcement Initiatives on Evasive Foreign Accounts”: AEJ_public_archive. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2020. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2020-07-06. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112222V1-43222

To view the citation for the overall project, see http://doi.org/10.3886/E112222V1.

Project Description

Summary: This deposit contains the data and code from "Taxing Hidden Wealth." This material has been cleared for public release by the Internal Revenue Service. See the readme file for further details.

Abstract:

In 2008, the IRS initiated efforts to curb the use of offshore accounts to evade taxes. This paper uses administrative microdata to examine the impact of enforcement efforts on taxpayers’ reporting of offshore accounts and income. We find that enforcement caused approximately 50,000 individuals to disclose offshore accounts with a combined value of about $100 billion. Most disclosures happened outside offshore voluntary disclosure programs, by individuals who never admitted prior noncompliance. Disclosed accounts were concentrated in countries often characterized as tax havens. Enforcement-driven disclosures increased annual reported capital income by $2-$4 billion, corresponding to $0.6-$1.2 billion in additional tax revenue.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
H24 Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies; includes inheritance and gift taxes
H26 Tax Evasion and Avoidance

Data Type(s): aggregate data; program source code

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Published Versions

V1 [2020-07-06]

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DDI 2.5

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