Data and Code for: Optimal climate policy when damages are unknown
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Ivan Rudik, Cornell University
Version: View help for Version V1
Name | File Type | Size | Last Modified |
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estimate_damage_parameters | 09/04/2019 01:24:PM | ||
generate_plots | 09/04/2019 05:29:PM | ||
results | 09/04/2019 05:24:PM | ||
terminal | 08/07/2019 06:31:PM | ||
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text/x-common-lisp | 6.4 KB | 08/01/2019 01:23:PM |
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text/plain | 15.4 KB | 09/04/2019 01:27:PM |
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application/xhtml+xml | 1.1 MB | 09/04/2019 01:27:PM |
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text/x-web-markdown | 15.4 KB | 09/04/2019 01:27:PM |
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text/x-matlab | 37.3 KB | 09/04/2019 03:32:PM |
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text/x-matlab | 2.1 KB | 07/27/2019 02:14:PM |
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Project Citation:
Rudik, Ivan. Data and Code for: Optimal climate policy when damages are unknown. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2025. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2020-04-24. https://doi.org/10.3886/E111185V1
Project Description
Summary:
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Integrated assessment models (IAMs) are economists' primary tool for analyzing the optimal carbon tax. Damage functions, which link temperature to economic impacts, have come under fire because of their assumptions that may be incorrect in significant, but a priori unknowable ways. Here I develop recursive IAM frameworks to model uncertainty, learning, and concern for misspecification about damages. I decompose the carbon tax into channels capturing state uncertainty, insurance motives, and precautionary saving. Damage learning improves ex ante welfare by $750 billion. If damage functions are misspecified and omit the potential for catastrophic damages, robust control may be beneficial ex post.
Scope of Project
Subject Terms:
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climate change;
damages;
social cost of carbon
JEL Classification:
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H23 Externalities • Redistributive Effects • Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Q54 Climate • Natural Disasters and Their Management • Global Warming
Q58 Government Policy
Q58
H23 Externalities • Redistributive Effects • Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Q54 Climate • Natural Disasters and Their Management • Global Warming
Q58 Government Policy
Q58
Geographic Coverage:
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Global
Time Period(s):
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1/1/2005 – 1/1/2205 (Simulations cover 2005-2105 or 2005-2205.)
Data Type(s):
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other
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