Replication package for: Why are corporations terminated? A century of evidence from the Netherlands
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Christopher L. Colvin, Queen's University Belfast; Abe de Jong, University of Groningen; Philip T. Fliers, Queen's University Belfast; Florian Madertoner, Rotterdam School of Management
Version: View help for Version V2
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Project Citation:
Project Description
Why are corporations terminated? A century of evidence from the Netherlands
Published in Business History.
We identify all 196 Dutch exchange-listed corporations that halted their operations and ceased to exist between 1903 and 1996. We then explain these terminations using unique hand-collected accounting and governance data and regression techniques that allow us to conduct long-run comparative analysis. Despite bankruptcy laws remaining unchanged, corporate termination patterns shifted across the century: shareholder-induced voluntary liquidations dominated before WWII, while creditor-driven bankruptcies prevailed thereafter. Our analyses suggest this shift reflected a broader transformation in corporate purpose, from a liberal shareholder-centric model that prevailed before WWII, to a stakeholder-focused paradigm that emerged among Dutch business elites in the post-war period. We find that the Dutch government’s 1970s industrial policy experimentation failed to curb bankruptcies. Our results highlight how shifts in corporate purpose can reshape business outcomes, even without legal changes.
Scope of Project
Methodology
- Control group: using an extensive hand-collected dataset which contains all accounting and corporate governance information available on all Dutch exchange-listed corporations collected on a five-yearly frequency (1903, 1908, etc.).
- A firm enters our sample as a voluntary liquidation if shareholders actively decided to terminate their corporation in a shareholder meeting, following BW Article 2:19(1a). Conversely, a firm enters our sample as an involuntary bankruptcy if the firm was first in default of payment and some legal entity, typically a creditor, filed for bankruptcy using FW Article 1, causing the firm to be declared bankrupt subsequently according to BW Article 2:19(1c).
- Our corporate governance information is supplemented by the board composition information of the 50 largest Dutch banks
Van Oss Effectenboek (1903-1972)
Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (1980-1996)
Related Publications
Published Versions
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