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Project Citation: 

Caradonna, Peter, Miller, Nathan, and Sheu, Gloria. Code for: Mergers, Entry, and Consumer Welfare. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2025. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2025-07-17. https://doi.org/10.3886/E206681V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary We model merger-induced entry in the context of differentiated-products price competition. We fully characterize the combinations of merger efficiencies and entrant qualities that can mitigate the adverse equilibrium welfare effects of an otherwise anticompetitive merger. The possibility of merger-induced entry introduces non-monotonicity into the equilibrium value that consumers receive from merger efficiencies, potentially necessitating the joint analysis of efficiencies and entry in merger review.  We also explicitly characterize the efficiencies required for merger-induced entrants to make profitable mergers consumer surplus-neutral.  We provide an empirical application to the T-Mobile/Sprint merger.

Scope of Project

Subject Terms:  View help for Subject Terms mergers; entry; merger efficiencies; antitrust
JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      K21 Antitrust Law
      L13 Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
      L41 Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices


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