Name File Type Size Last Modified
  SHRUG 05/07/2024 06:28:PM
  Uttar_Pradesh_2010_GP_elections 05/07/2024 06:30:PM
  census 05/09/2024 04:22:PM
  financial 05/09/2024 11:53:AM
  gp_elections 05/07/2024 10:35:PM
  gp_minutes 05/07/2024 10:59:PM
  indira_awaas_yojana 05/07/2024 11:01:PM
  jal_jeevan 05/09/2024 01:14:PM
  lgdirectory 05/07/2024 06:07:PM
  mission_antyodaya 05/07/2024 11:52:PM

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary Developing countries have increasingly decentralized power to local governments. This paper studies the implications of a central element of decentralization -- polity size -- using population-based discontinuities that determine local government boundaries for over 100,000 Indian villages. Over the short and long-run, individuals allocated into local governments with smaller populations have better access to public goods. We provide suggestive evidence that these results are related to heightened civic engagement and stronger political incentives, but not to other mechanisms such as elite capture.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
      H41 Public Goods
      H75 State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
      O12 Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
      P43 Other Economic Systems: Public Economics; Financial Economics
Geographic Coverage:  View help for Geographic Coverage Uttar Pradesh, India


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