Data and Code for: The Dynamic Consequences of State-Building: Evidence from the French Revolution
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Cédric Chambru, ENS Lyon; Emeric Henry, Sciences Po; Benjamin Marx, Boston University
Version: View help for Version V1
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code | 07/22/2024 06:09:PM | ||
data | 02/20/2024 04:10:PM | ||
output | 02/20/2024 04:10:PM | ||
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application/pdf | 524.8 KB | 07/24/2024 09:27:AM |
Project Citation:
Chambru, Cédric, Henry, Emeric, and Marx, Benjamin. Data and Code for: The Dynamic Consequences of State-Building: Evidence from the French Revolution. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2024. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2024-09-19. https://doi.org/10.3886/E198461V1
Project Description
Summary:
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How do radical reforms of the state shape economic development over time? In 1790, France's first Constituent Assembly overhauled the kingdom's organization to set up new administrative entities and local capitals. In a subset of new artificial departments, the choice of local capitals at the expense of rival candidate cities was plausibly exogenous. Comparing capitals with other candidate cities that were not ultimately chosen, we study how changes in local administrative presence affect economic development in the ensuing decades. In the short run, administrative proximity increases taxation and investments in law enforcement. This gradually translates into higher levels of public goods provision, while economic benefits only materialize in the longer run. One hundred years after the reform, capitals are 40% more populated than other candidate cities. Our results shed new light on the dynamic and redistributive impacts of state-building in the context of one of the most ambitious administrative reforms ever implemented.
Scope of Project
Subject Terms:
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Administrative Reform;
Economic Development;
State Capacity;
State-Building
JEL Classification:
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D70 Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
H41 Public Goods
H71 State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
O43 Institutions and Growth
D70 Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
H41 Public Goods
H71 State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
O43 Institutions and Growth
Geographic Coverage:
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France
Time Period(s):
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1789 – 2015
Methodology
Collection Mode(s):
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other;
web scraping
Unit(s) of Observation:
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Municipality
Geographic Unit:
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Municipality
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