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Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary We experimentally examine the Becker-Shapley-Shubik two-sided matching model. In the experiment, the aggregate outcomes of matching and surplus are affected by whether equal split is in the core and whether efficient matching is assortative; the canonical cooperative theory predicts no effect. In markets with an equal number of participants on both sides, individual payoffs cannot be explained by existing refinements of the core, but are consistent with our noncooperative model's predictions. In markets with unequal numbers of participants, noncompetitive outcomes, are not captured by the canonical cooperative model, but are included in the set of predictions in our noncooperative model.

Scope of Project

Subject Terms:  View help for Subject Terms economics
JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      C71 Cooperative Games
      C72 Noncooperative Games
      C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
      C90 Design of Experiments: General
Geographic Coverage:  View help for Geographic Coverage China
Universe:  View help for Universe Experimental subjects
Data Type(s):  View help for Data Type(s) experimental data


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