Data and code for: Does the Squeaky Wheel Get More Grease? The Direct and Indirect Effects of Citizen Participation on Environmental Governance in China

Principal Investigator(s):  View help for Principal Investigator(s) Mark Buntaine, University of California-Santa Barbara; Michael Greenstone, University of Chicago; Guojun He, University of Hong Kong; Mengdi Liu, University of International Business and Economics; Shaoda Wang, University of Chicago; Bing Zhang, Nanjing University of Finance &Economics

Version:  View help for Version V1

Name File Type Size Last Modified
._COD.gph multipart/appledouble 4 KB 12/11/2023 12:00:AM
._COD_aggregate.gph multipart/appledouble 4 KB 12/11/2023 12:00:AM
._Figure1.pdf multipart/appledouble 4 KB 12/11/2023 12:00:AM
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._Figure5.pdf multipart/appledouble 4 KB 12/11/2023 12:00:AM
._FigureA1.pdf multipart/appledouble 4 KB 12/11/2023 12:00:AM
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Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary We conducted a nationwide field experiment in China to evaluate the direct and indirect impacts of assigning firms to public or private citizen appeals when they violate pollution standards. There are three main findings. First, public appeals to the regulator through social media substantially reduce violations and pollution emissions, while private appeals cause more modest environmental improvements. Second, public appeals appear to tilt regulators’ focus away from facilitating economic growth and toward avoiding pollution-induced public unrest.  Third, pollution reductions by treated firms are not offset by control firms, based on randomly varying the proportion of treatment firms at the prefecture-level. 

Scope of Project

Subject Terms:  View help for Subject Terms citizen participation; social media; environmental governance
JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      P26 Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies: Political Economy; Property Rights
      P28 Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies: Natural Resources; Energy; Environment
      Q52 Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
Geographic Coverage:  View help for Geographic Coverage China
Universe:  View help for Universe Polliting firms in China.
Data Type(s):  View help for Data Type(s) administrative records data; experimental data

Methodology

Sampling:  View help for Sampling The sample is comprised of the 24,620 polluting firms required to install Continuous Emissions Monitoring System (CEMS) by the central government by January 1st, 2020. 
Data Source:  View help for Data Source Data on Continuous Emissions Monitoring System, 2020
Data on Citizen appeals to the 12369 Environmental Appeals Center, 2020
Data from State Administration for Market Regulation

Collection Mode(s):  View help for Collection Mode(s) other; web scraping
Unit(s) of Observation:  View help for Unit(s) of Observation Firm

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Published Versions

V1 [2024-02-14]

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