Data and Code for: Public debt and the political economy of reforms

Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Pierre Boyer, Ecole polytechnique - CREST; Christoph Esslinger, VUI.agency; Brian Roberson, Purdue University

Version: View help for Version V1

Name	File Type	Size	Last Modified
DataAvailabilityComplement.tex	text/x-matlab	4.7 KB	09/02/2023 08:28:AM
DataAvailabilityMain.tex	text/x-matlab	3.2 KB	09/02/2023 08:28:AM

Project Description

Summary: How do electoral incentives influence the choice to experiment with a policy reform that generates uncertain future benefits? To answer this question, we examine a two-period model of redistributive politics with uncertain policy outcomes involving a mixture of private and public benefits. In equilibrium, we find that the intertemporal tradeoff between current policy costs and future benefits creates an incentive for politicians to use public debt to smooth spending across periods. The higher the share of policy benefits that are in the form of a public good, the higher the level of available debt-related spending on targeted policies that is necessary.

Scope of Project

Subject Terms: public debt; reforms; debt and spending limits

JEL Classification:
      C72 Noncooperative Games
      D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
      D78 Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
      H60 National Budget, Deficit, and Debt: General

Geographic Coverage: OECD countries

Data Type(s): aggregate data; program source code

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Published Versions

V1 [2024-06-19]

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DDI 2.5

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