Data and Code for: Carbon Border Adjustments, Climate Clubs, and Subsidy Races When Climate Policies Vary
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Kimberly Clausing, UCLA School of Law; Catherine Wolfram, MIT Sloan
Version: View help for Version V1
Name | File Type | Size | Last Modified |
---|---|---|---|
|
application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet | 244.6 KB | 06/01/2023 07:21:AM |
|
application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet | 247.3 KB | 05/26/2023 01:39:PM |
|
text/plain | 5.6 KB | 05/26/2023 02:31:PM |
|
application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet | 1.5 MB | 05/26/2023 02:24:PM |
|
image/jpeg | 33.2 KB | 05/26/2023 02:14:PM |
|
application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet | 3.8 KB | 05/26/2023 02:22:PM |
|
application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet | 1.1 MB | 05/26/2023 02:14:PM |
|
application/pdf | 130.3 KB | 09/01/2023 01:43:PM |
Project Citation:
Clausing, Kimberly, and Wolfram, Catherine. Data and Code for: Carbon Border Adjustments, Climate Clubs, and Subsidy Races When Climate Policies Vary. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2023. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2023-09-27. https://doi.org/10.3886/E192048V1
Project Description
Summary:
View help for Summary
Carbon Border Adjustments, Climate Clubs, and Subsidy Races When Climate Policies Vary
Abstract: Jurisdictions adopt heterogeneous climate policies that vary both in terms of ambition and in terms of policy approach, with some jurisdictions pricing carbon and others subsidizing clean production. We distinguish two types of policy spillovers associated with diverse policy approaches to climate change. First, when countries have different levels of climate ambition, free-riders will benefit at the expense of more committed countries. Second, when countries pursue different approaches, carbon-intensive producers within cost-imposing jurisdictions will be at a relative competitive disadvantage compared with producers in subsidizing jurisdictions. Carbon border adjustments and climate clubs are attempts to respond to these policy spillovers, but when countries have divergent policy approaches, one policy alone will not be able to address both types of spillovers. We also consider the policy dynamics that result from carbon border adjustments and climate clubs; both have the potential to encourage upward harmonization of climate policy, but they come with risks. Further, the pressures of international competition in the presence of divergent climate policy approaches may result in subsidy races, which come with their own potential risks and benefits.
Abstract: Jurisdictions adopt heterogeneous climate policies that vary both in terms of ambition and in terms of policy approach, with some jurisdictions pricing carbon and others subsidizing clean production. We distinguish two types of policy spillovers associated with diverse policy approaches to climate change. First, when countries have different levels of climate ambition, free-riders will benefit at the expense of more committed countries. Second, when countries pursue different approaches, carbon-intensive producers within cost-imposing jurisdictions will be at a relative competitive disadvantage compared with producers in subsidizing jurisdictions. Carbon border adjustments and climate clubs are attempts to respond to these policy spillovers, but when countries have divergent policy approaches, one policy alone will not be able to address both types of spillovers. We also consider the policy dynamics that result from carbon border adjustments and climate clubs; both have the potential to encourage upward harmonization of climate policy, but they come with risks. Further, the pressures of international competition in the presence of divergent climate policy approaches may result in subsidy races, which come with their own potential risks and benefits.
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
View help for JEL Classification
F18 Trade and Environment
H23 Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Q54 Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
Q58 Environmental Economics: Government Policy
F18 Trade and Environment
H23 Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Q54 Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
Q58 Environmental Economics: Government Policy
Geographic Coverage:
View help for Geographic Coverage
aggregate country level data across the world
Time Period(s):
View help for Time Period(s)
2019 – 2021
Collection Date(s):
View help for Collection Date(s)
10/1/2022 – 5/15/2023
Universe:
View help for Universe
countries, and in one case, industries
Data Type(s):
View help for Data Type(s)
aggregate data
Collection Notes:
View help for Collection Notes
This is all publicly available data collected from web sites.
Related Publications
Published Versions
Report a Problem
Found a serious problem with the data, such as disclosure risk or copyrighted content? Let us know.
This material is distributed exactly as it arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.