ECIN Replication package for "Dishonesty as a Collective-Risk Social Dilemma"

Principal Investigator(s):  View help for Principal Investigator(s) Shuguang Jiang, Centre for Economic Research, Shandong University; MARIE CLAIRE VILLEVAL, CNRS

Version:  View help for Version V2

Name File Type Size Last Modified
  1.ALL_Rarw_data 05/06/2023 10:47:AM
2.All Raw Data.dta application/x-stata-dta 5 MB 06/12/2023 10:56:PM
2.All the raw data.xlsx application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet 1.4 MB 06/14/2023 11:47:AM
3.Stata code of “Dishonesty as a Collective-Risk Social Dilemma”.do text/plain 26.9 KB 06/12/2023 10:49:PM
4. Code Book of Variables.docx application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document 19.7 KB 06/12/2023 10:49:PM
5. Instruction_N3_Chinese.docx application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document 46.7 KB 06/12/2023 10:49:PM
5. Instruction_N6_Chinese.docx application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document 46.3 KB 06/12/2023 10:49:PM
5.Instruction_Nolying_Chinese.docx application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document 54.8 KB 06/12/2023 10:49:PM
6. Dice Probability Calculation.docx application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document 20 KB 06/12/2023 10:49:PM
README.docx application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document 19.5 KB 06/14/2023 11:38:AM

Project Citation: 

Jiang, Shuguang, and VILLEVAL, MARIE CLAIRE. ECIN Replication package for “Dishonesty as a Collective-Risk Social Dilemma.” Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2023-06-15. https://doi.org/10.3886/E191041V2

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary Replication package for the article "Dishonesty as a Collective-Risk Social Dilemma". We investigated lying as a collective-risk social dilemma. Misreporting resulted in increased individual earnings but when total claims reached a certain threshold, all group members were at risk of collective sanction, regardless of their individual behavior. Due to selfishness and a lack of coordination, most individuals earned less than the reservation payoff from honest reporting in the group. However, preferences for truth-telling lowered the risk of collective sanction in this setting compared to a social dilemma game in which players could make direct claims without lying. The risk of sanctions decreased with risk aversion and a smaller group size.
Funding Sources:  View help for Funding Sources National Social Science Fund of China ( 21BJL126); Shandong Province Natural Science Foundation (ZR2021MG024); Taishan Scholar Fund ( tsqn20213022); LABEX CORTEX of Université de Lyon (ANR-11-LABX-0042)

Scope of Project

Subject Terms:  View help for Subject Terms Dishonesty; Experiment; Collectivism; Group size; Public Bad
JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      C91 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
      D01 Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
      D91 Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
Manuscript Number:  View help for Manuscript Number ECIN-Jul-2022-0328.R3


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V2 [2023-06-15]

V1 [2023-05-06]

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