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ECIN Replication package for "Dishonesty as a Collective-Risk Social Dilemma" 0

Project Citation: 

Jiang, Shuguang, and VILLEVAL, MARIE CLAIRE. ECIN Replication package for “Dishonesty as a Collective-Risk Social Dilemma.” Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2023-05-06. https://doi.org/10.3886/E191041V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary Replication package for the article "Dishonesty as a Collective-Risk Social Dilemma". We investigated lying as a collective-risk social dilemma. Misreporting resulted in increased individual earnings but when total claims reached a certain threshold, all group members were at risk of collective sanction, regardless of their individual behavior. Due to selfishness and a lack of coordination, most individuals earned less than the reservation payoff from honest reporting in the group. However, preferences for truth-telling lowered the risk of collective sanction in this setting compared to a social dilemma game in which players could make direct claims without lying. The risk of sanctions decreased with risk aversion and a smaller group size.

Scope of Project

Subject Terms:  View help for Subject Terms [Dishonesty; , Experiment; , Collectivism; , Group size; , Public Bad; ]
JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      C91 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
      D01 Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
      D91 Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
Manuscript Number:  View help for Manuscript Number ECIN-Jul-2022-0328.R3


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