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Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary
We study a problem in which policymakers need to screen self-selected individuals by unobserved heterogeneity in social welfare gains from a policy intervention. In our framework, the marginal treatment effects and marginal treatment responses arise as key statistics to characterize social welfare. We apply this framework to a randomized field experiment on electricity plan choice. Consumers were offered welfare-improving dynamic pricing with randomly assigned take-up incentives. We find that price-elastic consumers—who generate larger welfare gains—are more likely to self-select. Our counterfactual simulations quantify the optimal take-up incentives that exploit observed and unobserved heterogeneity in selection and welfare gains.

Scope of Project

Subject Terms:  View help for Subject Terms Randomized Control Trial
JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      L94 Electric Utilities
      Q41 Energy: Demand and Supply; Prices
Data Type(s):  View help for Data Type(s) program source code


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