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Data and Code for: Does Disappointment Aversion Explain Non-Truthful Reporting in Strategy-Proof Mechanisms?

Principal Investigator(s):  View help for Principal Investigator(s) Roy Chen, Chair of Microeconomics, RWTH Aachen, Germany; Peter Katuščák, Chair of Microeconomics, RWTH Aachen, Germany; Thomas Kittsteiner, Chair of Microeconomics, RWTH Aachen, Germany; Katharina Kütter, Chair of Microeconomics, RWTH Aachen, Germany

Version:  View help for Version V3

Name File Type Size Last Modified
  0-readme_licenses 10/06/2023 03:43:AM
  1-experiment 04/18/2023 08:56:AM
  2-rawdata 04/18/2023 08:56:AM
  3-analysis_results 04/18/2023 08:56:AM

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary Disappointment aversion has been suggested as an explanation for non-truthful rankings in strategy-proof school-choice matching mechanisms. We test this hypothesis using a novel experimental design that eliminates important alternative causes of non-truthful rankings. The design uses a simple contingent choice task with only two possible outcomes. Between two treatments, we manipulate the possibility for disappointment aversion to have an effect on ranking. We find a small and statistically marginally significant treatment effect in the direction predicted by disappointment aversion. We therefore conclude that disappointment aversion is a minor contributor to non-truthful rankings in strategy-proof school-choice matching mechanisms.



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Published Versions

V5 [2024-09-05]

V4 [2023-10-10]

V3 [2023-10-06]

V2 [2023-04-18]

V1 [2023-04-18]

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