Data and Code for: The Economic Origins of Government
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Leander Heldring, Northwestern University; Mattia C. Bertazzini, Oxford; Robert C. Allen, New York University: Abu Dhabi
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Description
Summary:
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This repository contains data and replication files for: The Economic Origins of Government.
Abstract:
We test between cooperative and extractive theories of the origins of government. We use river shifts in southern Iraq as a natural experiment, in a new archeological panel dataset. A shift away creates a local demand for a government to coordinate because private river irrigation needs to be replaced with public canals. It disincentivizes local extraction as land is no longer productive without irrigation. Consistent with a cooperative theory of government, a river shift away led to state formation, canal construction, and the payment of tribute. We argue that the first governments coordinated between extended households which implemented public good provision.
Abstract:
We test between cooperative and extractive theories of the origins of government. We use river shifts in southern Iraq as a natural experiment, in a new archeological panel dataset. A shift away creates a local demand for a government to coordinate because private river irrigation needs to be replaced with public canals. It disincentivizes local extraction as land is no longer productive without irrigation. Consistent with a cooperative theory of government, a river shift away led to state formation, canal construction, and the payment of tribute. We argue that the first governments coordinated between extended households which implemented public good provision.
Scope of Project
Subject Terms:
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Coordination;
Extraction;
Government;
Iraq
JEL Classification:
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H70 State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: General
N00 Economic History: General
O10 Economic Development: General
O13 Economic Development: Agriculture; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Other Primary Products
H70 State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: General
N00 Economic History: General
O10 Economic Development: General
O13 Economic Development: Agriculture; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Other Primary Products
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