Data and code for: The Common-Probability Auction Puzzle
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Kathleen Ngangoue, UCLA Anderson; Andrew Schotter, NYU
Version: View help for Version V1
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ExpAll | 03/10/2023 09:37:PM | ||
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ExpIII | 03/10/2023 09:37:PM | ||
ExpIIIb | 03/10/2023 09:37:PM | ||
ExpIV | 03/10/2023 09:37:PM | ||
graphs | 03/10/2023 09:48:PM | ||
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application/pdf | 477.3 KB | 03/10/2023 04:36:PM |
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text/plain | 1 KB | 03/10/2023 04:36:PM |
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Project Citation:
Ngangoue, Kathleen, and Schotter, Andrew. Data and code for: The Common-Probability Auction Puzzle. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2023. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2023-05-22. https://doi.org/10.3886/E184041V1
Project Description
Summary:
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This
paper presents a puzzle of the behavior of experimental subjects
in
what we call common-probability auctions. In common-value
auctions,
uncertainty is defined over values, while in common-probability
auctions,
uncertainty is defined over probabilities. We find that in
contrast
to the substantial overbidding found in common-value auctions,
bidding
in strategically equivalent common-probability auctions
is
consistent with Nash equilibrium. In order to explain our results, we run
treatments to identify whether our observed difference stems from the way our
subjects estimate the value of the object they are bidding for in a competitive
environment rather than the way they bid conditional on these valuations. We
conclude it is the former.
Scope of Project
Subject Terms:
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auction;
uncertainty;
winner's curse;
common value
JEL Classification:
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C70 Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
C90 Design of Experiments: General
D44 Auctions
D81 Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
C70 Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
C90 Design of Experiments: General
D44 Auctions
D81 Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Geographic Coverage:
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USA
Time Period(s):
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2018 – 2020
Collection Date(s):
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2018 – 2020
Universe:
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students at New York University
Data Type(s):
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experimental data
Methodology
Data Source:
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experimental data (new collection)
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