Data and Code for "Hassle Costs versus Information: How Do Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs Reduce Opioid Prescribing?"
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Abby Alpert, University of Pennsylvania; Sarah Dykstra, Amazon; Mireille Jacobson, University of Southern California
Version: View help for Version V1
Name | File Type | Size | Last Modified |
---|---|---|---|
Input | 11/22/2022 11:08:AM | ||
SAS Scripts | 11/22/2022 11:18:AM | ||
Stata Scripts | 04/25/2023 10:51:AM | ||
|
application/pdf | 214.7 KB | 04/25/2023 06:34:AM |
Project Citation:
Alpert, Abby, Dykstra, Sarah , and Jacobson, Mireille. Data and Code for “Hassle Costs versus Information: How Do Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs Reduce Opioid Prescribing?” Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2024. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2024-01-19. https://doi.org/10.3886/E183162V1
Project Description
Summary:
View help for Summary
This repository contains the code and public data for replicating the findings in "Hassle Costs versus Information: How Do Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs Reduce Opioid Prescribing?" Please note that a full replication of the empirical analysis requires confidential data from OptumInsight. Data
may be obtained through data use agreements directly with Optum or other
entities that have a license permitting access to researchers through
third-party contracts.
Project Abstract: We study hassle costs versus information provision in explaining how prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMPs) decrease opioid prescribing. PDMPs aim to reduce opioid prescribing through information provision but may also unintentionally affect prescribing through the hassle of required record checks. We analyze Kentucky’s landmark PDMP to disentangle these two mechanisms. Hassle costs reduce opioid prescribing across the board, including to opioid-naïve patients; however, physicians continue to prescribe opioids to patients who would benefit the most. Although information also affects prescribing, hassle costs explain the majority of the decline. Introducing a cost to prescribing high-risk medications improves the targeting of treatment.
Project Abstract: We study hassle costs versus information provision in explaining how prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMPs) decrease opioid prescribing. PDMPs aim to reduce opioid prescribing through information provision but may also unintentionally affect prescribing through the hassle of required record checks. We analyze Kentucky’s landmark PDMP to disentangle these two mechanisms. Hassle costs reduce opioid prescribing across the board, including to opioid-naïve patients; however, physicians continue to prescribe opioids to patients who would benefit the most. Although information also affects prescribing, hassle costs explain the majority of the decline. Introducing a cost to prescribing high-risk medications improves the targeting of treatment.
Scope of Project
Subject Terms:
View help for Subject Terms
opioid policy;
PDMP;
hassle costs
JEL Classification:
View help for JEL Classification
I10 Health: General
I12 Health Behavior
I18 Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
I10 Health: General
I12 Health Behavior
I18 Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
Geographic Coverage:
View help for Geographic Coverage
United States
Time Period(s):
View help for Time Period(s)
2006 – 2016
Universe:
View help for Universe
Emergency Department Visits
Related Publications
Published Versions
Report a Problem
Found a serious problem with the data, such as disclosure risk or copyrighted content? Let us know.
This material is distributed exactly as it arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.