Data and Code for: Collateralized Marriage
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Jeanne Lafortune, Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile; Corinne Low, University of Pennsylvania. The Wharton School
Version: View help for Version V1
| Name | File Type | Size | Last Modified |
|---|---|---|---|
| Replication | 04/14/2023 03:54:PM |
Project Citation:
Lafortune, Jeanne, and Low, Corinne. Data and Code for: Collateralized Marriage. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2023. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2023-09-28. https://doi.org/10.3886/E164541V1
Project Description
Summary:
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Data and code to replicate empirical results in "Collateralized Marriage."
Abstract: Marriage rates have become increasingly stratified by homeownership. We investigate this in a household model where investments in public goods reduce future earnings, and thus divorce risk creates inefficiencies. Access to a joint savings technology, like a house, "collateralizes" marriage, providing insurance to the lower earning partner and increasing specialization, public goods, and value from marriage. We use idiosyncratic variation in housing prices to show that homeownership access indeed leads to greater specialization. The model also predicts that policies that erode the marriage contract in other ways will make wealth a more important determinant of marriage, which we confirm empirically.
Data includes compiled Census / American Community Survey Data, PSID data, SIPP data, ATUS data, and FHFA housing price data, all of which are publicly available.
Abstract: Marriage rates have become increasingly stratified by homeownership. We investigate this in a household model where investments in public goods reduce future earnings, and thus divorce risk creates inefficiencies. Access to a joint savings technology, like a house, "collateralizes" marriage, providing insurance to the lower earning partner and increasing specialization, public goods, and value from marriage. We use idiosyncratic variation in housing prices to show that homeownership access indeed leads to greater specialization. The model also predicts that policies that erode the marriage contract in other ways will make wealth a more important determinant of marriage, which we confirm empirically.
Data includes compiled Census / American Community Survey Data, PSID data, SIPP data, ATUS data, and FHFA housing price data, all of which are publicly available.
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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D13 Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation
D14 Household Saving; Personal Finance
D31 Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
J12 Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure; Domestic Abuse
J22 Time Allocation and Labor Supply
J24 Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
D13 Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation
D14 Household Saving; Personal Finance
D31 Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
J12 Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure; Domestic Abuse
J22 Time Allocation and Labor Supply
J24 Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
Geographic Coverage:
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United States
Data Type(s):
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census/enumeration data;
survey data
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