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Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary Chinese local leaders are frequently moved across prefectures. By combining local leader rotation data and comprehensive firm land parcel purchase data across prefectures from 2006 to 2016, this paper examines how firm-politician connections affect resource allocation and finds that a firm headquartered in a leader's previous work prefecture purchases three times more land parcels in that leader's new governing prefecture than the prefecture-year mean, at half the unit prices. Identification is from within firm-year variation in various prefectures through exogenous politician rotation. Land usage efficiency is lower for these follower firms' land parcels. Land allocation distortion is also economically sizable.

Scope of Project

Subject Terms:  View help for Subject Terms Land; Politician Rotation; China
JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      D73 Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
      O10 Economic Development: General
      P26 Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies: Political Economy; Property Rights
Geographic Coverage:  View help for Geographic Coverage China
Universe:  View help for Universe Public firms in China
Data Type(s):  View help for Data Type(s) event/transaction data; observational data

Methodology

Unit(s) of Observation:  View help for Unit(s) of Observation Firm

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