Code for: Increasing the Cost of Informal Workers: Evidence from Mexico

Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Brenda Samaniego de la Parra, University of California - Santa Cruz; Leon Fernandez Bujanda, Banco do Mexico

Version: View help for Version V1

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1.create_panel_emply.do	text/plain	2.6 KB	05/27/2023 08:52:PM
1.enoe_compiled_panel_workers.do	text/plain	16.9 KB	05/27/2023 08:52:PM
10.imss_employr_payrl_const.do	text/plain	2.2 KB	05/27/2023 08:52:PM
11.imss_inspect_workr_payrr.do	text/plain	822 bytes	05/27/2023 08:52:PM
12.imss_inspect_emplead_next.do	text/plain	1.6 KB	06/02/2023 07:05:PM
13.imss_inspect_workr_panel.do	text/plain	6.7 KB	05/27/2023 08:52:PM
14.imss_inspect_workr_panel_prp.do	text/plain	6.9 KB	05/27/2023 08:52:PM
15.imss_workers_table_4.do	text/plain	6.1 KB	06/02/2023 07:26:PM
2.enoe_figures_4_6a_6c.do	text/plain	5.8 KB	05/27/2023 08:52:PM
2.imss_establc_panel.do	text/plain	7.9 KB	05/27/2023 08:52:PM

Project Citation:

Samaniego de la Parra, Brenda, and Fernandez Bujanda, Leon. Code for: Increasing the Cost of Informal Workers: Evidence from Mexico. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2023. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2023-12-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E153041V1

Project Description

Summary:

We estimate the effect of increasing the cost of informal jobs on formal firms’ and workers’ outcomes. We combine administrative records and household surveys, and exploit exogenous variation in the cost of informality generated by over 480,000 random work- site inspections in Mexico. For informal workers, inspections temporarily increase the probability of being formalized at the inspected firm, but separations also rise. For formal workers, we find temporary increases in the probability of remaining formally employed at the inspected firm and in monthly wages. At the firm level, increasing the cost of informal jobs leads to persistently lower formal employment.

Scope of Project

Subject Terms: informal economy; payroll taxes ; enforcement; labor demand

JEL Classification:
      D22 Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
      E26 Informal Economy; Underground Economy
      J46 Informal Labor Markets

Geographic Coverage: Mexico

Time Period(s): 2005 – 2016

Universe: Universe of formal firms in Mexico with at least one formally employed worker between January 2005 and December 2016.
Sample of individuals age 16 to 75 years old covered by ENOE's surveys between January 2005 and December 2016.

Data Type(s): administrative records data; survey data

Methodology

Data Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI), 2005-2016. “Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo [database]” (INEGI ENOE). Accessed through INEGI’s MicroDataLab. https://www.inegi.org.mx/app/microdatos/solicitud/

Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social (IMSS), 2005-2016. “Registro de derechohabientes, salarios de cotización, y patrones [database]” (Banxico IMSS). accessed through Banco de México EconLab, Data Sharing Agreement Number 45.

Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social. 2005-2016a. “Directorio Nacional de Empresas.” Plataforma de Transparencia
Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social. 2005-2016b. “Registro de inspecciones. Sistema de Seguimiento Inspectivo Sancionador.” Plataforma de Transparencia.
https://www.plataformadetransparencia.org.mx

Unit(s) of Observation: Formal firms, Workers (16-75 years old)

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Published Versions

V1 [2023-12-12]

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