Data and code for: "Estimating Social Preferences and Gift Exchange at Work"
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Stefano DellaVigna, UC Berkeley; John List, University of Chicago; Ulrike Malmendier, UC Berkeley; Gautam Rao, Harvard University
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Description
Summary:
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This deposit contains code and data for "Estimating Social Preferences and Gift Exchange at Work".
Abstract: We design three field experiments to estimate the nature and magnitude of workers’ social preferences towards their employers. The experiments vary the return to the employer and employer generosity towards workers (“gifts”). Including variation in pay rates—either piece rates or wage rates—allows us to estimate the elasticity of work outcomes and benchmark the workers' social preferences toward the employer. The first experiment measures productivity—units of output produced in a fixed amount of time. The second and third experiments measure the willingness to do extra work. We document that productivity is rather unresponsive to financial incentives, while the willingness to perform extra work is very responsive. In terms of social preferences, we document, first, that workers exert effort for their employer even in the absence of private incentives, but are insensitive to the return to the employer. This result is consistent with models of warm glow or social norms regarding work effort, but not pure altruism towards the employer. Second, while we do not detect any effect of the gifts in the productivity experiment, we find moderate positive impacts in the extra-work experiments. We show that this difference is partly explained by the disparate elasticities of productivity and extra work.
Abstract: We design three field experiments to estimate the nature and magnitude of workers’ social preferences towards their employers. The experiments vary the return to the employer and employer generosity towards workers (“gifts”). Including variation in pay rates—either piece rates or wage rates—allows us to estimate the elasticity of work outcomes and benchmark the workers' social preferences toward the employer. The first experiment measures productivity—units of output produced in a fixed amount of time. The second and third experiments measure the willingness to do extra work. We document that productivity is rather unresponsive to financial incentives, while the willingness to perform extra work is very responsive. In terms of social preferences, we document, first, that workers exert effort for their employer even in the absence of private incentives, but are insensitive to the return to the employer. This result is consistent with models of warm glow or social norms regarding work effort, but not pure altruism towards the employer. Second, while we do not detect any effect of the gifts in the productivity experiment, we find moderate positive impacts in the extra-work experiments. We show that this difference is partly explained by the disparate elasticities of productivity and extra work.
Scope of Project
Subject Terms:
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Field Experiment;
Reciprocity;
Gift Exchange;
Pay-rate Design
JEL Classification:
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D90 Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: General
D90 Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: General
Geographic Coverage:
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Unites States; Online Sample
Universe:
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One-time workers; Student workers; Online Sample
Data Type(s):
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experimental data
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