Replication Data for: Local Elites as State Capacity: How City Chiefs Use Local Information to Increase Tax Compliance in the D.R. Congo

Principal Investigator(s):  View help for Principal Investigator(s) Jonathan Weigel, University of California-Berkeley; Gabriel Tourek, University of Pittsburgh; Augustin Bergeron, Stanford University; Pablo Balan, University of Tel Aviv

Version:  View help for Version V1

Name File Type Size Last Modified
  Replication Materials 10/21/2021 02:37:PM
_ PublicationAgreement-AER - BALAN.pdf application/pdf 109.8 KB 10/29/2021 07:16:AM
_ PublicationAgreement-AER - BERGERON.pdf application/pdf 109.8 KB 10/20/2021 10:02:AM
_ PublicationAgreement-AER - TOUREK.pdf application/pdf 115.4 KB 10/25/2021 07:57:AM
_ PublicationAgreement-AER - WEIGEL.pdf application/pdf 192.9 KB 10/20/2021 07:05:AM
_ PublicationAgreement-AER.pdf application/pdf 307.2 KB 10/20/2021 05:56:AM
balan-et-al_forthcoming.tex text/x-matlab 313.4 KB 10/29/2021 07:11:AM
bib_cvl.bib application/x-bibtex-text-file 107.5 KB 10/21/2021 12:55:PM

Project Citation: 

Weigel, Jonathan, Tourek, Gabriel, Bergeron, Augustin, and Balan, Pablo. Replication Data for: Local Elites as State Capacity: How City Chiefs Use Local Information to Increase Tax Compliance in the D.R. Congo. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2022. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2022-02-24. https://doi.org/10.3886/E147561V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary This paper investigates the tradeoffs between local elites and state agents as tax collectors in low-capacity states. We study a randomized policy experiment assigning neighborhoods of a large Congolese city to property tax collection by city chiefs or state agents. Chief collection raised tax compliance by 3.2 percentage points, increasing revenue by 44\%. Chiefs collected more bribes but did not undermine tax morale or trust in government. Results from a hybrid treatment arm in which state agents consulted with chiefs before collection suggest that chief collectors achieved higher compliance by using local information to more efficiently target households with high payment propensities, rather than by being more effective at persuading households to pay conditional on having visited them.

These files contain data and replication files for the article.
Funding Sources:  View help for Funding Sources EGAP Metaketa II Taxation Initiative; International Centre for Tax and Development

Scope of Project

Subject Terms:  View help for Subject Terms H20; H20; P48
JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      D73 Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
      H20 Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
      P48 Other Economic Systems: Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
Geographic Coverage:  View help for Geographic Coverage Democratic Republic of the Congo
Time Period(s):  View help for Time Period(s) 2017 – 2019
Collection Date(s):  View help for Collection Date(s) 2017 – 2019
Data Type(s):  View help for Data Type(s) administrative records data; survey data


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