Data and code for: M Equilibrium: A Theory of Beliefs and Choices in Games
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Jacob K. Goeree, AGORA Center for Market Design, UNSW; Philippos Louis, University of Cyprus
Version: View help for Version V1
| Name | File Type | Size | Last Modified |
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| Code | 08/20/2021 08:42:AM | ||
| Data | 08/20/2021 08:42:AM | ||
| Software and instructions | 08/20/2021 08:43:AM | ||
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application/pdf | 157 KB | 08/20/2021 04:42:AM |
Project Citation:
Goeree, Jacob K., and Louis, Philippos. Data and code for: M Equilibrium: A Theory of Beliefs and Choices in Games. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2021. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2021-11-19. https://doi.org/10.3886/E145561V1
Project Description
Summary:
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We introduce a set-valued solution concept, M equilibrium, to capture empirical regularities from over half a century of game-theory experiments. We show M equilibrium serves as a meta theory for various models that hitherto were considered unrelated. M equilibrium is empirically robust and, despite being set-valued, falsifiable. Results from a series of experiments that compare M equilibrium to leading behavioral-game-theory models demonstrate its virtues in predicting observed choices and stated beliefs. Data from experimental games with a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and multiple M equilibria exhibit coordination problems that could not be anticipated through the lens of existing models.
Scope of Project
Subject Terms:
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human behavior;
economic behavior;
games
JEL Classification:
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C72 Noncooperative Games
C92 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
C72 Noncooperative Games
C92 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Collection Date(s):
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9/1/2018 – 10/31/2018
Methodology
Sampling:
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A random sample of individuals registered with the UCY - LExEcon standard subject pool was invited through email and registered at a first-come-first-served basis to the available experimental sessions. Role assignment within each session was randomized.
Collection Mode(s):
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other
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