Data and Code for: License Complementarity and Package Bidding: U.S. Spectrum Auctions

Principal Investigator(s):  View help for Principal Investigator(s) Mo Xiao, The University of Arizona; Zhe Yuan, Zhejiang University

Version:  View help for Version V1

Name File Type Size Last Modified
AfterEstBeliefPW_Designated.dta application/x-stata-dta 1.6 MB 07/09/2021 03:59:AM
AfterEstBeliefPW_National.dta application/x-stata-dta 1.8 MB 07/09/2021 03:59:AM
AfterEstBeliefPW_Regional.dta application/x-stata-dta 778.7 KB 07/09/2021 03:59:AM
AfterEstBeliefbid_Designated.dta application/x-stata-dta 208.8 KB 07/09/2021 03:59:AM
AfterEstBeliefbid_National.dta application/x-stata-dta 201 KB 07/09/2021 03:59:AM
AfterEstBeliefbid_Regional.dta application/x-stata-dta 171.9 KB 07/09/2021 03:59:AM
BEAREA_mixed_CB.dta application/x-stata-dta 2.4 MB 07/09/2021 03:59:AM
BEA_mixed_CB.dta application/x-stata-dta 2.6 MB 07/09/2021 03:59:AM
BeforeAnalysis_balanced_indexPW.dta application/x-stata-dta 607.4 MB 07/09/2021 03:59:AM
BeforeAnalysis_balanced_indexPW_CB_merge.dta application/x-stata-dta 432.6 MB 07/09/2021 03:59:AM
    Total of 326 records. Records per page
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Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary
U.S. spectrum licenses cover geographically distinct areas and often complement each other. A bidder seeking to acquire multiple licenses is then exposed to risks of winning only isolated patches. We evaluate the extent to which allowing bidders to bid for (predetermined) packages of licenses alleviates the exposure problem and improves allocation eciency. Using Auction 73 bidding data, we model the bidding process as an entry game with interdependent markets and evolving bidder belief. Bidders' decisions on bidding (and not bidding) provide bounds on licenses' stand-alone values and complementarity between licenses. With estimated bidder valuation, we conduct counterfactual analyses to show that the e ects of package bidding on bidders' exposure risks depend on package format and package size. More importantly, package bidding increases auction revenue substantially, at the cost of reducing bidder surplus and increasing license allocation concentration.

Scope of Project

Subject Terms:  View help for Subject Terms Specturm Auction; Complementarity; Package Bidding; Moment Inequality
JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      L13 Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
      L50 Regulation and Industrial Policy: General
      L96 Telecommunications
Geographic Coverage:  View help for Geographic Coverage United States
Universe:  View help for Universe FCC auction 73
Data Type(s):  View help for Data Type(s) administrative records data; census/enumeration data

Methodology

Data Source:  View help for Data Source FCC
US census
Collection Mode(s):  View help for Collection Mode(s) mixed mode
Unit(s) of Observation:  View help for Unit(s) of Observation 1289079
Geographic Unit:  View help for Geographic Unit county

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Published Versions

V1 [2022-10-21]

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DDI 2.5

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