Data and Code for: Do Women Respond Less to Performance Pay? Building Evidence from Multiple Experiments

Principal Investigator(s):  View help for Principal Investigator(s) Oriana Bandiera, Department of Economics and STICERD, LSE and CEPR; Greg Fischer, School of Public Policy and STICERD, LSE and CEPR; Andrea Prat, Columbia University and CEPR; Erina Ytsma, Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University

Version:  View help for Version V1

Name File Type Size Last Modified
  R-BuildingEvidence 12/23/2020 11:11:PM
  data 12/23/2020 11:11:PM
  do 12/23/2020 11:12:PM
  logs 12/23/2020 11:11:PM
README.txt text/plain 12.2 KB 03/12/2021 01:39:PM

Project Citation: 

Bandiera, Oriana, Fischer, Greg, Prat, Andrea, and Ytsma, Erina. Data and Code for: Do Women Respond Less to Performance Pay? Building Evidence from Multiple Experiments. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2021. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2021-11-23. https://doi.org/10.3886/E129821V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary Existing empirical work raises the hypothesis that performance pay – whatever its output gains – may widen the gender earnings gap, because women may respond less to incentives. We evaluate this possibility by aggregating evidence from existing experiments on performance incentives with male and female subjects. Using a Bayesian hierarchical model we estimate both the average effect and heterogeneity across studies. We find that the gender response difference is close to zero and heterogeneity across studies small, while performance pay increases output by 0.36 standard deviations on average. The data thus support agency theory for men and women alike.


Scope of Project

Subject Terms:  View help for Subject Terms wage differentials; gender; econometrics; meta-analysis
JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      C11 Bayesian Analysis: General
      J16 Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
      J31 Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Geographic Coverage:  View help for Geographic Coverage Canada, USA, Sweden, Burkina Faso, China, UK, Zambia, Israel, France, Switzerland, Germany
Time Period(s):  View help for Time Period(s) 2005 – 2012
Data Type(s):  View help for Data Type(s) experimental data; program source code
Collection Notes:  View help for Collection Notes
We identified a set of studies on performance pay and collated the data to estimate both the average gender differences in the response to performance incentives as well as heterogeneity across studies using a Bayesian hierarchical model. To maximize the number of studies while ensuring quality and replicability of our aggregation process, we included only field and lab experiments published in peer-reviewed economics journals or a selected set of discussion paper series between 1990 and 2012. To capture studies that provide evidence relevant for understanding the effect of performance pay in the workplace, we further required that (i) agents exert real and costly effort; (ii) performance is measured at the individual level; and (iii) the study includes at least two pay treatments, one of which is unambiguously more high-powered than the other.




Methodology

Data Source:  View help for Data Source
We collected the data sets of the papers that met the inclusion criteria for our meta-analysis (outlined above) either directly from the study authors, or through the journals that published the papers.The former data files are not available in this deposit, since we do not have permission to publish these files.

Data sets available online, through the journals that published the papers:
  • Angrist, Joshua, and Lavy, Victor. Replication data for: The Effects of High Stakes High School Achievement Awards: Evidence from a Randomized Trial. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2009. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113319V1
  • Angrist, Joshua, Lang, Daniel, and Oreopoulos, Philip. Replication data for: Incentives and Services for College Achievement: Evidence from a Randomized Trial. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2009. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-12-07. https://doi.org/10.3886/E116327V1
  • Ariely, Dan, Bracha, Anat, and Meier, Stephan. Replication data for: Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2009. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113292V1
  • Carpenter, Jeffrey, Matthews, Peter Hans, and Schirm, John. Replication data for: Tournaments and Office Politics: Evidence from a Real Effort Experiment. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2010. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112333V1
  • Dohmen, Thomas, and Falk, Armin. Replication data for: Performance Pay and Multidimensional Sorting: Productivity, Preferences, and Gender. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2011. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112408V1
  • Fehr, Ernst, and Goette, Lorenz. Replication data for: Do Workers Work More if Wages Are High? Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2007. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-12-07. https://doi.org/10.3886/E116259V1
  • Freeman, Richard B., and Gelber, Alexander M. Replication data for: Prize Structure and Information in Tournaments: Experimental Evidence. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2010. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113737V1
  • Gill, David, and Prowse, Victoria. Replication data for: A Structural Analysis of Disappointment Aversion in a Real Effort Competition. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2012. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112499V1



Related Publications

Download this project

Published Versions

V1 [2021-11-23]

Export Metadata

Dublin Core

DDI 2.5

Report a Problem

Found a serious problem with the data, such as disclosure risk or copyrighted content? Let us know.

This material is distributed exactly as it arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.