Data and Code for: Political Fragmentation and Government Stability. Evidence from Local Governments in Spain

Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Felipe Carozzi, London School of Economics; Davide Cipullo, Uppsala University; Luca Repetto, Uppsala University

Version: View help for Version V1

Name	File Type	Size	Last Modified
Clean			02/08/2021 09:47:AM
Intermediate			02/08/2021 09:45:AM
Other			02/08/2021 09:48:AM
Raw			02/08/2021 09:45:AM

Project Description

Summary:

This paper studies how political fragmentation affects government stability. Using a regression-discontinuity design, we show that each additional party with representation in the local parliament increases the probability that the incumbent government is unseated by 5 percentage points. The entry of an additional party affects stability by increasing both the probability of a single-party majority and the instability of governments when such a majority is not feasible. We interpret our results in light of a bargaining model of coalition formation featuring government instability.

Scope of Project

Subject Terms: Government Stability; No-confidence votes; Bargaining

JEL Classification:
      H10 Structure and Scope of Government: General
      H70 State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: General
      R50 Regional Government Analysis: General

Geographic Coverage: Spanish Municipalities

Universe: Spanish Municipalities

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Published Versions

V1 [2022-03-21]

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