Data and Code for: Political Fragmentation and Government Stability. Evidence from Local Governments in Spain
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Felipe Carozzi, London School of Economics; Davide Cipullo, Uppsala University; Luca Repetto, Uppsala University
Version: View help for Version V1
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Citation:
To view the citation for the overall project, see http://doi.org/10.3886/E125341V1.
Project Description
This paper studies how political fragmentation affects government stability. Using a regression-discontinuity design, we show that each additional party with representation in the local parliament increases the probability that the incumbent government is unseated by 5 percentage points. The entry of an additional party affects stability by increasing both the probability of a single-party majority and the instability of governments when such a majority is not feasible. We interpret our results in light of a bargaining model of coalition formation featuring government instability.
Scope of Project
H10 Structure and Scope of Government: General
H70 State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: General
R50 Regional Government Analysis: General
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