Data and code for: Behavioral Constraints on the Design of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanisms
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Ernst Fehr, Department of Economics, Zurich University; Michael Powell, Strategy Department, Kellogg School of Management; Tom Wilkening, Department of Economics, University of Melbourne
Version: View help for Version V1
Name | File Type | Size | Last Modified |
---|---|---|---|
AEA Data and Code Repository | 10/21/2020 11:35:PM |
Project Citation:
Project Description
Scope of Project
C92 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
D23 Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
D71 Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
D86 Economics of Contract: Theory
Methodology
We recruited 27 subjects for a session that required 20 participants. If more than 20 participants showed up, we would randomly select the participants who were brought into the experiment and those that were paid a show-up fee and dismissed.
The sample was restricted to participants who had not participated in earlier sessions of this experiment, sessions of Aghion, Holden, Fehr, and Wilkening (2018), or sessions of Chen, Holden, Kunimoto, Sun, and Wilkening (2020).
Related Publications
Published Versions
Found a serious problem with the data, such as disclosure risk or copyrighted content? Let us know.
This material is distributed exactly as it arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.