Data and Code for: The Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership: The Case of Paragraph IV Generic Entry
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Jin Xie, The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Xie, Jin. Data and Code for: The Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership: The Case of Paragraph IV Generic Entry. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2020. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2020-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E120742V1
Project Description
Summary:
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Brand-name pharmaceutical companies often file lawsuits
against generic drug manufacturers that challenge the monopoly status of
patent-protected drugs. Institutional horizontal shareholdings, measured by the
generic shareholders' ownership in the brand-name company relative to their
ownership in the generic manufacturer, are significantly positively associated
with the likelihood that the two parties enter into a settlement agreement in
which the brand pays the generic manufacturer to stay out of the market.
Funding Sources:
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Hong Kong Research Grants Council. General Research Fund (14507416)
Scope of Project
Subject Terms:
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Common ownership;
Settlement agreement;
Pharmaceutical industry;
Patent infringement lawsuit;
Antitrust
JEL Classification:
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G23 Pension Funds; Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
G30 Corporate Finance and Governance: General
L12 Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
L41 Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
G23 Pension Funds; Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
G30 Corporate Finance and Governance: General
L12 Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
L41 Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Geographic Coverage:
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United States
Time Period(s):
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11/1/2003 – 8/30/2017
Collection Date(s):
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7/1/2015 – 10/31/2019
Universe:
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Pharmaceutical firms in the United States, 2003-2017
Institutional Investors in the United States, 2000-2017
Institutional Investors in the United States, 2000-2017
Data Type(s):
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administrative records data
Methodology
Sampling:
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Our data come from The Paragraph Four Report, which is an electronic publication of Parry Ashford Inc. The company tracks and analyzes Paragraph~IV activities. The database starts with Paragraph~IV cases that were active as of November 1, 2003. Active branded products are those that had a Paragraph~IV challenge, had a pending lawsuit, and were not available as a generic as of November 1, 2003. The company followed each case through completion (i.e., settlement or court of appeals). Once a generic product enters the market after final termination of litigation, the product is removed from the list and sent to the Old Cases section. The Old Cases section includes products and cases closed after November 1, 2003.
Data Source:
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The Paragraph Four Report, which is an electronic publication of Parry Ashford Inc.
Collection Mode(s):
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other;
web scraping
Unit(s) of Observation:
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Paragraph IV Lawsuit
Geographic Unit:
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Lawsuit
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