Data and Code for Different Strokes for Different Folks

Principal Investigator(s):  View help for Principal Investigator(s) Manoj Mohanan, Duke University; Katherine Donato, Boston Consulting Group; Grant Miller, Stanford University; Yulya Truskinovsky, Wayne State University; Marcos Vera Hernández, University College London

Version:  View help for Version V1

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  Replication 07/14/2020 05:47:AM
README.txt text/plain 1.6 KB 07/23/2020 10:43:AM

Project Citation: 

Mohanan, Manoj, Donato, Katherine, Miller, Grant, Truskinovsky, Yulya, and Vera Hernández, Marcos. Data and Code for Different Strokes for Different Folks . Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2021. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2021-09-20. https://doi.org/10.3886/E119741V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary Despite recent increases in institutional deliveries in India, birth outcomes have been slow to improve. One likely explanation is low quality medical care, which is common in many parts of India. Low quality medical care in India cannot simply be attributed to insufficient medical knowledge among providers. Instead there is evidence that, even among knowledgeable clinicians, provider effort is very low – suggesting poor alignment between clinician incentives and patient health. 

To address low quality medical care directly, we conducted a policy experiment in Karnataka to evaluate the effectiveness of financial incentives to maternity care providers for (a) the clinical quality of services (e.g., assessing the mother’s blood pressure on arrival during labor) provided to women from their patient lists and catchment areas, and (b) rates of adverse maternal and neonatal health outcomes (e.g., rates of post-partum hemorrhage) among women from their patient lists and catchment areas. Performance bonuses for clinical quality hold some promise for better aligning physician incentives with patient needs. Moreover, directly rewarding lower rates of adverse maternal and neonatal health outcomes flexibly identifies a socially desirable outcome without rigidly prescribing how it should be achieved – allowing local providers to use their local knowledge of what health improvement strategies are likely to work best. We study effect of input and output contracts on providers with varying levels of skills.
Funding Sources:  View help for Funding Sources 3ie (OW2: 205); World Bank HRITF (TF099435)

Scope of Project

Subject Terms:  View help for Subject Terms Incentives; Contracts; Performance
JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      D86 Economics of Contract: Theory
      J41 Labor Contracts
      O15 Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
Geographic Coverage:  View help for Geographic Coverage India
Time Period(s):  View help for Time Period(s) 2012 – 2014


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V1 [2021-09-20]

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