Name File Type Size Last Modified
  Sessions 05/11/2020 01:43:AM
create text/x-stata-syntax 3.2 KB 05/10/2020 09:42:PM
turfwars.dta application/x-stata 508.4 KB 05/10/2020 09:06:PM
zTree program turfwars.ztt application/octet-stream 71.5 KB 05/10/2020 09:28:PM

Project Citation: 

Herrera, Helios, Reuben, Ernesto, and Ting, Michael M. Replication data for: Turf wars. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2020-05-11.

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary Turf wars in organizations commonly occur in environments where competition undermines collaboration. We develop a game theoretic model and experimental test of turf wars. The model explores how team production incentives ex post affect team formation decisions ex ante. In the game, one agent decides whether to share jurisdiction over a project with other agents. Agents with jurisdiction decide whether to exert effort and receive a reward based on their relative performance. Hence, sharing can increase joint production but introduces competition for the reward. We find that collaboration has a non-monotonic relationship with both productivity and rewards. The laboratory experiment confirms the model's main predictions.

Related Publications

Published Versions

Export Metadata

Report a Problem

Found a serious problem with the data, such as disclosure risk or copyrighted content? Let us know.

This material is distributed exactly as it arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.