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Project Citation: 

Reuben, Ernesto, and Riedl, Arno. Replication data for: Public Goods Provision and Sanctioning in Privileged Groups. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2020-05-10.

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary In public-good provision, privileged groups enjoy the advantage that some of their members find it optimal to supply a positive amount of the public good. However, the inherent asymmetric nature of these groups may make the enforcement of cooperative behavior through informal sanctioning harder to accomplish. In this article, the authors experimentally investigate public-good provision in normal and privileged groups with and without decentralized punishment. The authors find that compared to normal groups, privileged groups are relatively ineffective in using costly sanctions to increase everyone's contributions. Punishment is less targeted toward strong free riders, and they exhibit a weaker increase in contributions after being punished. Thus, the authors show that privileged groups are not as privileged as they initially seem.

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