Replication files for "Nonrivalry and the Economics of Data"
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Charles I. Jones, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business; Christopher Tonetti, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Description
Summary:
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This repository contains the code needed to replicate all the results (figures and tables) in the Jones and Tonetti paper "Nonrivalry and the Economics of Data."
Abstract: Data is nonrival: a person's location history, medical records, and driving data can be used by many firms simultaneously. Nonrivalry leads to increasing returns. As a result, there may be social gains to data being used broadly across firms, even in the presence of privacy considerations. Fearing creative destruction, firms may choose to hoard their data, leading to the inefficient use of nonrival data. Giving data property rights to consumers can generate allocations that are close to optimal. Consumers balance their concerns for privacy against the economic gains that come from selling data broadly.
Abstract: Data is nonrival: a person's location history, medical records, and driving data can be used by many firms simultaneously. Nonrivalry leads to increasing returns. As a result, there may be social gains to data being used broadly across firms, even in the presence of privacy considerations. Fearing creative destruction, firms may choose to hoard their data, leading to the inefficient use of nonrival data. Giving data property rights to consumers can generate allocations that are close to optimal. Consumers balance their concerns for privacy against the economic gains that come from selling data broadly.
Scope of Project
Subject Terms:
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nonrivalry;
economics of data;
property rights
JEL Classification:
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E22 Investment; Capital; Intangible Capital; Capacity
O34 Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
O43 Institutions and Growth
E22 Investment; Capital; Intangible Capital; Capacity
O34 Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
O43 Institutions and Growth
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