Data and Code for: Sources of Inaction in Household Finance: Evidence from the Danish Mortgage Market

Principal Investigator(s):  View help for Principal Investigator(s) Steffen Andersen, Copenhagen Business School; John Y. Campbell, Harvard University; Kasper Meisner Nielsen, Copenhagen Business School; Tarun Ramadorai, Imperial College

Version:  View help for Version V1

Name File Type Size Last Modified
0_Main.do text/x-stata-syntax 3.4 KB 04/08/2020 12:41:PM
1_Data.do text/x-stata-syntax 89.3 KB 04/08/2020 05:29:AM
2_MLfunctions_1.do text/x-stata-syntax 30.3 KB 04/08/2020 05:30:AM
3_Analyses.do text/x-stata-syntax 124 KB 07/07/2020 09:51:AM
4_Appendix.do text/x-stata-syntax 312.3 KB 04/08/2020 05:31:AM
ChenLingOptionValues.py text/x-python 9.2 KB 04/08/2020 05:31:AM
GOOGLETRENDS.txt text/plain 2.3 KB 05/04/2020 04:52:AM
HOUSEPRICEDATA.txt text/plain 1.7 KB 05/04/2020 04:56:AM
INFLATION.txt text/plain 6.3 KB 05/04/2020 04:52:AM
INTERESTRATES.txt text/plain 21 KB 05/04/2020 04:52:AM

Project Citation: 

Andersen, Steffen, Campbell, John Y., Nielsen, Kasper Meisner, and Ramadorai, Tarun. Data and Code for: Sources of Inaction in Household Finance: Evidence from the Danish Mortgage Market. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2020. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2020-09-23. https://doi.org/10.3886/E118762V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary We build an empirical model to attribute delays in mortgage refinancing to psychological costs inhibiting refinancing until incentives are sufficiently strong; and behavior---potentially attributable to information-gathering costs---lowering the probability of household refinancing per unit time at any incentive. We estimate the model on administrative panel data from Denmark, where mortgage refinancing without cash-out is unconstrained.  Middle-aged and wealthy households act like they have high psychological refinancing costs; but older, poorer, and less educated households refinance with lower probability irrespective of incentives, thereby achieving lower savings.  We use the model to understand frictions in the mortgage channel of monetary policy transmission.We build an empirical model to attribute delays in mortgage refinancing to psychological costs inhibiting refinancing until incentives are sufficiently strong; and behavior---potentially attributable to information-gathering costs---lowering the probability of household refinancing per unit time at any incentive. We estimate the model on administrative panel data from Denmark, where mortgage refinancing without cash-out is unconstrained.  Middle-aged and wealthy households act like they have high psychological refinancing costs; but older, poorer, and less educated households refinance with lower probability irrespective of incentives, thereby achieving lower savings.  We use the model to understand frictions in the mortgage channel of monetary policy transmission.


Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      G21 Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
      G40 Behavioral Finance: General
Geographic Coverage:  View help for Geographic Coverage Denmark
Time Period(s):  View help for Time Period(s) 2009 – 2017
Data Type(s):  View help for Data Type(s) program source code


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