Data and Code for "Patronage and Selection in Public Sector Organizations"

Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Edoardo Teso, Northwestern University; Emanuele Colonnelli, University of Chicago; Mounu Prem, Universidad del Rosario

Version: View help for Version V1

Name	File Type	Size	Last Modified
Map			04/05/2020 02:31:PM
CBO_subgroup_cat.dta	application/x-stata	2.4 KB	04/05/2020 10:31:AM
MacroVariables.xlsx	application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet	40 KB	04/05/2020 10:31:AM
correct_mayors_missing_id.dta	application/x-stata	7.5 KB	04/05/2020 10:31:AM
correct_mistakes_coalition.dta	application/x-stata	13.6 KB	04/05/2020 10:31:AM
correct_mistakes_politician_id.dta	application/x-stata	29.2 KB	04/05/2020 10:31:AM
municipio_codes.dta	application/x-stata	49.4 KB	04/05/2020 10:31:AM
occupation_cbo2002_minimumeduc_alljobs.dta	application/x-stata	356.4 KB	04/05/2020 10:31:AM

Citation:

Teso, Edoardo, Colonnelli, Emanuele, and Prem, Mounu. Data and Code for “Patronage and Selection in Public Sector Organizations”: Replication_files: Data: AUX. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2020. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2020-09-23. https://doi.org/10.3886/E118165V1-132541

To view the citation for the overall project, see http://doi.org/10.3886/E118165V1.

Project Description

Summary: In all modern bureaucracies, politicians retain some discretion in public employment decisions, which may lead to frictions in the selection process if political connections substitute for individual competence. Relying on detailed matched employer-employee data on the universe of public employees in Brazil over 1997-2014, and on a regression discontinuity design in close electoral races, we establish three main findings. First, political connections are a key and quantitatively large determinant of employment in public organizations, for both bureaucrats and frontline providers. Second, patronage is an important mechanism behind this result. Third, political considerations lead to the selection of less competent individuals.

Scope of Project

Subject Terms: Public Sector ; Bureaucrats; Patronage

JEL Classification:
      D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
      J45 Public Sector Labor Markets
      O10 Economic Development: General

Geographic Coverage: Brazil

Universe: Local candidates and donors in municipal elections in Brazil

Data Type(s): administrative records data

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Published Versions

V1 [2020-09-23]

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