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  RentControlPP_replication 12/07/2019 03:27:PM
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Project Citation: 

Diamond, Rebecca, McQuade, Tim, and Qian, Franklin. Replication data for: Who Pays for Rent Control? Heterogeneous Landlord Response to San Francisco’s Rent Control Expansion. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2019. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-12-07. https://doi.org/10.3886/E116460V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary Using a 1994 law change, we exploit quasi-experimental variation in the assignment of rent control in San Francisco to study which types of landlords bear the burden of decreased rental payments versus substitute away from supplying rent-controlled housing. We find rent control leads to a long-run decrease in the supply of rental housing. This effect is more pronounced among properties managed by corporate landlords versus individual landlords. Raising revenue for rental subsidies through rent control appears to be regressive, since corporations can evade the tax burden of rent control more easily, likely due to their superior access to capital.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      K25 Real Estate Law
      R38 Production Analysis and Firm Location: Government Policy


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