Replication data for: Two-Sided Matching with (Almost) One-Sided Preferences

Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Guillaume Haeringer; Vincent Iehlé

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Project Citation:

Haeringer, Guillaume, and Iehlé, Vincent. Replication data for: Two-Sided Matching with (Almost) One-Sided Preferences. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2019. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-12-07. https://doi.org/10.3886/E116436V1

Project Description

Summary: In a two-sided matching context we show how we can predict stable matchings by considering only one side's preferences and the mutually acceptable pairs of agents. Our methodology consists of identifying impossible matches, i.e., pairs of agents that can never be matched together in a stable matching of any problem consistent with the partial data. We analyze data from the French academic job market for mathematicians and show that the match of about 45 percent of positions (and about 60 percent of candidates) does not depend on the preferences of the hired candidates, unobserved and submitted at the final stage of the market.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
      C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
      I23 Higher Education; Research Institutions
      J41 Labor Contracts
      J44 Professional Labor Markets; Occupational Licensing

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Published Versions

V1 [2019-12-07]

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