Replication data for: Do Markets Reduce Costs? Assessing the Impact of Regulatory Restructuring on US Electric Generation Efficiency

Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Kira R. Fabrizio; Nancy L. Rose; Catherine D. Wolfram

Version: View help for Version V1

Name	File Type	Size	Last Modified
FRW_data.do	text/plain	61.9 KB	12/07/2019 07:40:AM
LICENSE.txt	text/plain	14.6 KB	12/07/2019 07:40:AM
Plant_data_ext.dta	application/octet-stream	3.2 MB	12/07/2019 07:40:AM
T-D.do	text/plain	3.2 KB	12/07/2019 07:40:AM
TDGdata.dta	application/octet-stream	59.1 KB	12/07/2019 07:40:AM
frw1extract_enf.dta	application/octet-stream	12.4 MB	12/07/2019 07:40:AM
frw1extract_f.dta	application/octet-stream	12 MB	12/07/2019 07:40:AM
inputregs.do	text/plain	4.3 KB	12/07/2019 07:40:AM
inputregs_meanrev.do	text/plain	3.6 KB	12/07/2019 07:40:AM
inputregs_sizeage.do	text/plain	4.7 KB	12/07/2019 07:40:AM

Project Citation:

Fabrizio, Kira R., Rose, Nancy L., and Wolfram, Catherine D. Replication data for: Do Markets Reduce Costs? Assessing the Impact of Regulatory Restructuring on US Electric Generation Efficiency. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2007. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-12-07. https://doi.org/10.3886/E116286V1

Project Description

Summary: While neoclassical models assume static cost-minimization by firms, agency models suggest that firms may not minimize costs in less-competitive or regulated environments. We test this using a transition from cost-of-service regulation to marketoriented environments for many US electric generating plants. Our estimates of input demand suggest that publicly owned plants, whose owners were largely insulated from these reforms, experienced the smallest efficiency gains, while investor-owned plants in states that restructured their wholesale electricity markets improved the most. The results suggest modest medium-term efficiency benefits from replacing regulated monopoly with a market-based industry structure. (JEL D24, L11 , L51, L94, L98)

Scope of Project

Subject Terms: Productivity; Regulatory Restructuring; Electricity; Regulation; Electricity Generation

JEL Classification:
      D24 Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
      L11 Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
      L51 Economics of Regulation
      L94 Electric Utilities
      L98 Industry Studies: Utilities and Transportation: Government Policy

Geographic Coverage: United States

Time Period(s): 1981 – 1999

Universe: Fossil fuel generating plants

Data Type(s): administrative records data; other:

Methodology

Data Source: Primary data are from Utility Data Institute (UDI) O&M Production Cost Database (derived from FERC Form 1 (filed by investor-owned utilities), EIA Form 42 (filed by municipal and other government utilities), and RUS Form 7 & 2 ( FERC Form 1, Energy Information Administration). Other sources detailed in data appendix.

Unit(s) of Observation: Generating plant-year,

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V1 [2019-12-07]

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