Replication data for: Inherited Control and Firm Performance

Principal Investigator(s):  View help for Principal Investigator(s) Francisco Pérez-González

Version:  View help for Version V1

Name File Type Size Last Modified
LICENSE.txt text/plain 14.6 KB 12/07/2019 07:21:AM
basicdata.dta application/octet-stream 2 MB 12/07/2019 07:21:AM
ceotransitions.xls application/vnd.ms-excel 279 KB 12/07/2019 07:21:AM
lrevent.dta application/octet-stream 8.3 MB 12/07/2019 07:21:AM
readme.pdf application/pdf 10 KB 12/07/2019 07:21:AM
tablesinherited.do text/plain 11 KB 12/07/2019 07:21:AM

Project Citation: 

Pérez-González, Francisco. Replication data for: Inherited Control and Firm Performance. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2006. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-12-07. https://doi.org/10.3886/E116244V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary I use data from chief executive officer (CEO) successions to examine the impact of inherited control on firms’ performance. I find that firms where incoming CEOs are related to the departing CEO, to a founder, or to a large shareholder by either blood or marriage underperform in terms of operating profitability and market-to-book ratios, relative to firms that promote unrelated CEOs. Consistent with wasteful nepotism, lower performance is prominent in firms that appoint family CEOs who did not attend “selective” undergraduate institutions. Overall, the evidence indicates that nepotism hurts performance by limiting the scope of labor market competition. (JEL G32, G34, L25, M13)

Scope of Project

Subject Terms:  View help for Subject Terms Event study
JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      G32 Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
      G34 Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
      L25 Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope
      M13 New Firms; Startups
Geographic Coverage:  View help for Geographic Coverage United States
Time Period(s):  View help for Time Period(s) 1980 – 2001
Universe:  View help for Universe U.S. firms where concentrated ownership or family connections are likely to be important; and (b) where "normal"--nonperformance-related--CEO successions are expected to occur.
Data Type(s):  View help for Data Type(s) event/transaction data

Methodology

Data Source:  View help for Data Source COMPUSTAT, SEC EDGAR, News articles
Unit(s) of Observation:  View help for Unit(s) of Observation CEO succession event, one per sample firm,

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Published Versions

V1 [2019-12-07]

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