Name File Type Size Last Modified
  data 12/07/2019 08:22:AM
LICENSE.txt text/plain 14.6 KB 12/07/2019 03:22:AM

Project Citation: 

Besanko, David, Doraszelski, Ulrich, and Kryukov, Yaroslav. Replication data for: How Efficient Is Dynamic Competition? The Case of Price as Investment. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2019. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-12-07. https://doi.org/10.3886/E116206V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary We study industries where the price that a firm sets serves as an investment into lower cost or higher demand. We assess the welfare implications of the ensuing competition for the market using analytical and numerical approaches to compare the equilibria of a learning-by-doing model to the first-best planner solution. We show that dynamic competition leads to low deadweight loss. This cannot be attributed to similarity between the equilibria and the planner solution. Instead, we show how learning-by-doing causes the various contributions to deadweight loss to either be small or partly offset each other.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      D21 Firm Behavior: Theory
      D25 Intertemporal Firm Choice: Investment, Capacity, and Financing
      D43 Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
      D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
      L13 Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets


Related Publications

Published Versions

Export Metadata

Report a Problem

Found a serious problem with the data, such as disclosure risk or copyrighted content? Let us know.

This material is distributed exactly as it arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.