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Project Citation: 

Doepke, Matthias, and Kindermann, Fabian. Replication data for: Bargaining over Babies: Theory, Evidence, and Policy Implications. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2019. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-12-07. https://doi.org/10.3886/E116184V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary It takes a woman and a man to make a baby. This fact suggests that for a birth to take place, the parents should first agree on wanting a child. Using newly available data on fertility preferences and outcomes, we show that indeed, babies are likely to arrive only if both parents desire one. In addition, there are many couples who disagree on having babies, and in low-fertility countries women are much more likely than men to be opposed to having another child. We account for this evidence with a quantitative model of household bargaining in which the distribution of the burden of child care between mothers and fathers is a key determinant of fertility. The model implies that fertility is highly responsive to targeted policies that lower the child care burden specifically for mothers.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
      D13 Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation
      J13 Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
      J16 Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination


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